Ortega and Marías, critics of realism

Authors

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.63487/reo.634

Keywords:

Ortega y Gasset, Julián Marías, critical realism, perspectivism, truth, internal realism, conceptual relativity, relativism

Abstract

Ortega’s and Marías’ criticism of realism, in spite of being a fundamental ingredient of their philosophy, is poorly elaborated and it is effective only against a naïve realism very distant from the present varieties of realism. In fact, the critical realism developed in the last decades of 20th century offers interesting similarities with Ortega’s ratio-vitalism. One reason of that is that both share the will to overcome idealism while accepting some of its main achievements. However, there are also important differences between them, and these differences enable us to see clearly some limitations in the ratio-vitalism.

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Author Biography

Antonio Diéguez, Universidad de Málaga

A Professor of Logic and Philosophy of Science at the University of Málaga, he has been a visiting researcher in the Department of Philosophy at the University of Helsinki. His research interests focus on scientific realism, the philosophy of technology, and evolutionary epistemology. He is the author of numerous articles on epistemology and the philosophy of science and technology published in national and international journals. He is also the author of the following books: The Theory of Moral Sciences in John Stuart Mill (1988), Scientific Realism (1998), and Philosophy of Science (2005).

References

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Published

2006-05-01 — Updated on 2006-05-01

How to Cite

Diéguez, A. (2006). Ortega and Marías, critics of realism. Revista De Estudios Orteguianos (Journal of Orteguian Studies), (12/13), 131–152. https://doi.org/10.63487/reo.634

Issue

No. 12/13 (2006)

Section

Articles