Truth, Knowledge, and Reality in Ortega

Authors

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.63487/reo.732

Keywords:

Ortega y Gasset, intellectualism, parmenidanism, knowledge, truth, authenticity

Abstract

This paper analyses Ortega y Gasset’s theory of knowledge corresponding to the period that Ferrater Mora qualified as “perspectivism” and “ratio-vitalism”. We are interested to emphasize both the present importance of Ortega’s analysis and its limits. Specifically we will evaluate the scope of his anti-intellectualism and anti-parmenidanism, and his appeal to the concept of “authenticity”’ as explanation of the sense of knowledge.

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Author Biography

Antoni Defez i Martín, Universitat de Girona

Since 1994, he has been a tenured professor of philosophy (theory of knowledge) at the University of Girona. Currently, his main areas of research are theory of knowledge, philosophy of language, ontology, skepticism, realism, and personal identity. Among his most recent publications are “Belief and Normativity in the Origins of Analytic Philosophy” (2000), “Thought and Language in Early Wittgenstein” (2001), and “But I Am Me! Neo-Cartesianism and Personal Identity” (2002). He has also contributed to the Compendium of Epistemology, edited by J. Muñoz and J. Velarde (2000), with entries such as “Cartesianism,” “coherentism,” “corroboration,” “dogmatism,” “fideism,” and “epistemic virtues.”

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Published

2003-05-01 — Updated on 2003-05-01

How to Cite

Defez i Martín, A. (2003). Truth, Knowledge, and Reality in Ortega. Revista De Estudios Orteguianos (Journal of Orteguian Studies), (6), 119–132. https://doi.org/10.63487/reo.732

Issue

No. 6 (2003)

Section

Articles