The Perspectivism of Ortega. Four questions for a perspectivist

Authors

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.63487/reo.300

Keywords:

Ortega y Gasset, Perspective, Reality, Truth, Circumstance, Time, Perspectivism

Abstract

In this paper, we analyse Ortega's perspectivism such as it is presented in his brief and seminal work “Verdad y perspectiva” (“Truth and perspective”, 1916). We raise four crucial questions for perspectivism. And we argue that Ortega suggests an adequate kind of answer, which emphasizes the temporal nature of the perspectives or points of view. Our main thesis is that perspectivism acquires substantivity as a philosophical position when the temporal character of perspectives or points of view is seriously considered. Perspectivism has reappeared with force in the contemporary philosophical outlook. In our commentaries, we connect Ortega's perspectivism with various existing approaches.

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Author Biography

Antonio Manuel Liz Gutiérrez, Universidad de La Laguna

Professorial Chair, Department of Logic and Philosophy of Science, University of La Laguna. Member of the Department of Philosophy and History of Science, Education, and Language. Teaches mainly in the Faculty of Humanities, Philosophy Section. His lines of research are epistemology, philosophy of mind, philosophy of language, metaphysics, philosophy of science, and technology. His publications include Temporal Points of View. Objective and Subjective Aspects (2015), Points of View. A Philosophical Investigation (2013) and Reality Unveiled (2009).

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Published

2017-05-01 — Updated on 2017-05-01

How to Cite

Liz Gutiérrez, A. M. (2017). The Perspectivism of Ortega. Four questions for a perspectivist. Revista De Estudios Orteguianos, (34), 153–178. https://doi.org/10.63487/reo.300

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